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Abstract
Machine learning methods have recently created high expectations in the
climate modelling context in view of addressing climate change, but they
are often considered as non-physics-based ‘black boxes’ that may not pro-
vide any understanding. However, in many ways, understanding seems
indispensable to appropriately evaluate climate models and to build con-
fidence in climate projections. Relying on two case studies, we compare
how machine learning and standard statistical techniques affect our ability
to understand the climate system. For that purpose, we put five evalu-
ative criteria of understanding to work: intelligibility, representational
accuracy, empirical accuracy, coherence with background knowledge, and
assessment of the domain of validity. We argue that the two families
of methods are part of the same continuum where these various criteria
of understanding come in degrees, and that therefore machine learning
methods do not necessarily constitute a radical departure from standard
statistical tools, as far as understanding is concerned.
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1 Introduction
The topic of this paper is understanding with climate models. More specifically,
we are interested in the question of how the use of statistical techniques and
machine learning in climate models affects our ability to understand the climate
system and its response to external forcings. It is tempting to deny that under-
standing is important to climate modelling in the first place. The central task of
climate modelling, it could be argued, is to provide climate projections in order
to inform decision-makers about future climate change. Accordingly, it seems
that careful evaluation of the trustworthiness of climate model projections is a
more important matter to address than understanding.
But in many ways, understanding is not at all secondary for climate mod-
elling, quite to the contrary (e.g. Held 2005, Parker 2014). It can be convincingly
argued that understanding is an essential aspect of climate model evaluation: it
is crucial to the identification of the reasons for the successes or for the failures
of climate models to fit empirical data1 and furthermore, understanding is essen-
tial to building confidence in (e.g. long-term, high-forcing) climate projections
(Baumberger et al. 2017, Knutti 2018).
In recent years, the application of machine learning methods in climate mod-
elling have created high expectations in terms of more reliable climate (change)
projections. The use of machine learning in science has also been met with sus-
picion, in particular by those who emphasise the importance of understanding.
The predictive power we gain using these methods may come at the cost of
understanding, because machine learning models are non-physics-based, ‘black
box’ models (see e.g. López-Rubio and Ratti 2019 and Alain and Bengio 2016).
This potentially prevents understanding and the identification of proper ex-
planatory mechanisms whenever these methods are used in climate modelling.
However, the claim that machine learning prevents understanding with cli-
mate models altogether is an extreme position that should be avoided. For one,
difficulties with understanding also occur in climate modelling without machine
learning, for instance at the level of regional climate models, which are central to
tackling climate change and also use various standard statistical methods (and
hence constitute an interesting case study). We should expect a certain continu-
ity with respect to understanding between the use of machine learning and more
traditional statistical methods. Overstating the contrast between these meth-
ods may lead us to neglect a critical perspective on understanding in climate
modelling, independently of the use of machine learning methods.
1Such identification may actually be constrained by a form of holism of confirmation and
refutation that generally characterizes (complex) climate models (Lenhard and Winsberg
2010).
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What is more, it is generally acknowledged in the philosophical literature, if
only implicitly, that understanding comes in degrees (although this may not have
been taken seriously enough, see Baumberger 2019). One of the main points of
the present paper is that there is a continuum in climate modelling with respect
to various criteria of understanding. Taking this point seriously will allow us
to avoid the two extreme positions: neither is understanding completely absent
from or unimportant to climate modelling, nor is it completely eradicated by
the use of machine learning models.
Climate models are best considered with respect to their adequacy for a
certain purpose (Parker 2020), and many climate models (in particular regional
climate models relying on statistical techniques and climate models incorporat-
ing machine learning methods) may not have understanding as their primary
purpose. From this point of view, it can be asked to what extent and in what
sense these climate models can nevertheless provide some understanding; ad-
dressing these questions will allow for a more detailed characterization of the
understanding gap in climate modelling (highlighted in Held 2005).
The strategy of this paper is not to elaborate a general philosophical theory
of scientific understanding, valid across domains (as discussed in, e.g., Wilken-
feld 2017 and de Regt 2017). Rather, we focus on five evaluative criteria of
understanding in the context of climate modelling.2 They include intelligibility
in the sense of the ability to anticipate qualitative behaviour, representational
accuracy, empirical accuracy, coherence with background knowledge and assess-
ment of the domain of validity. We endeavour to articulate those criteria in
section 2. We then discuss how standard statistical techniques in regional cli-
mate modelling affect these five criteria of understanding in section 3, before
turning to climate modelling involving machine learning methods in section 4.
We finally discuss in section 5 how the five criteria come in degrees in a similiar
way in both cases, before concluding in section 6.
2 Understanding with scientific models
Historically, the distinction between explanation and understanding, viz. “erk-
lären” and “verstehen”, was introduced to emphasise the methodological and dis-
ciplinary oppositions between natural science and humanities; there was a lively
philosophical debate about this distinction at the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury, in particular in the German-speaking world. Later, the logical positivists
(e.g. Hempel and Oppenheim 1948) considered understanding to be a mere
psychological by-product of explanation, and a mental process that is internal
and hardly communicable. For this reason, understanding has been dismissed in
order to avoid human and subjective influence from the hypothetico-deductive
2The approach here is similar to the framework proposed in Knüsel and Baumberger (2020),
although our aims are different (and complementary): whereas they want to show that climate
models involving machine learning can provide some understanding in certain cases (they
discuss a case study, on which part of their argument crucially relies), we aim to emphasise
that this is all a matter of degree, already within ‘standard’ climate modelling without machine
learning.
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reconstruction of science. The psychological effect of cognitively grasping an
explanation (of ‘haha!’ or ‘Eureka!’ type) has later been called ‘sense of un-
derstanding’. It has been shown to artificially increase one’s confidence in ex-
planations, and therefore to be a fallible criterion for good explanations (e.g.
Trout 2002; and Kuorikoski 2011 in the context of computer simulations). Re-
cent philosophical accounts of understanding solve this problem by elaborating
a multidimensional concept, in particular in the context of the use of models
(cf. references in the next paragraph). By putting evaluative criteria forward,
they offer a concept of understanding that cannot be confounded anymore with
a mere subjective feeling, since one’s understanding can be measured by peo-
ple with respect to the very criteria. The criteria are supposed to account for
both (i) the adequacy of the model to produce explanations about the target
phenomenon or system, and (ii) the ability of the agents in drawing these ex-
planations from the model.
In this section, in order to compare understanding with machine learning
and understanding with common statistical tools, we use evaluative criteria for
understanding with a model in general. We provide five criteria that we mostly
adopt (with the notable exception of the fifth one) from the recent philosophical
literature on understanding and more particularly understanding with climate
models (e.g. Wilkenfeld 2017; Baumberger et al. 2017; Knüsel and Baumberger
2020). As we will argue, these criteria are not categorical, but come in degrees
depending on how well they are individually met.
2.1 Intelligibility
Understanding with a model presumes adequacy of the model to provide ex-
planations. But understanding with a model also requires understanding of
the model, and this bears on the intelligibility of the model (see, e.g., de Regt
and Dieks 2005; de Regt 2017; Wilkenfeld 2017). While adequacy concerns the
representational function of the model with respect to the target phenomenon,
intelligibility is based on the ability and skill of the agent to use the model and
to obtain explanations from it, and on the features of the model that enable its
manipulability (in agreement with the literature on the topic, we will focus on
these latter, and not on the more subjective features of the agent).3 The first
criterion we want to highlight is thus related to the intelligibility of the model.
A prominent criterion of intelligibility is provided by de Regt and Dieks
(2005). De Regt and Dieks (2005) suggest that a “scientific theory T is intelligi-
3Adequacy and intelligibility are commonly considered as the two central ‘pillars’ of un-
derstanding. Thus, de Regt distinguishes understanding a phenomenon–that is, having an
adequate explanation of the phenomenon–and understanding a theory–that is, being able to
use the theory (2017, 23). When Wilkenfeld (2017) introduces his Multiple Understanding
Dimensions (MUD) theory as “a natural synthesis of existing views” of understanding, he
argues that “representational-accuracy (of which we assume truth is one kind) and intelli-
gibility (which we will define so as to entail abilities) are good-making features of a state
of understanding” (Wilkenfeld 2017, 1274). Following the example, Knüsel and Baumberger
(2020, §3) offer three “dimensions” of understanding encompassing representational accuracy,
representational depth, and graspability.
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ble for scientists (in context C) if they can recognise qualitatively characteristic
consequences of T without performing exact calculations” (2005, 151). On this
view, understanding results from the reasoning of a computationally unaided
agent with the help of an external representation, i.e., a theory. However, in
the case of complex modelling, it is worth questioning whether it is possible
to anticipate qualitatively consequences without computer assistance. In many
contemporary scientific domains, e.g. in astrophysics and in climate science,
some predictions are impossible without running a computer simulation. Scien-
tists can familiarise themselves with the model, and probably learn to anticipate,
to some extent, the qualitative behaviour of the model, but only by using the
model in the first place, i.e. by making local changes in the model inputs, and
running computer simulations.
In such circumstances, intelligibility can rather be obtained through rele-
vant manipulation of the model, which then may allow one to anticipate its
qualitative behaviour. Following Kuorikoski and Ylikoski (2015), we assume
that understanding with a model should be viewed as an extended cognitive
activity that relies on the “inferential aid” of an implemented model used to
produce explanations and on the agent’s ability to manipulate the model. In
Kuorikoski and Ylikoski (2015)’s inferentialist account of model-based under-
standing, the understanding of a model is obtained by the ability of the agent
to answer what-if-things-would-have-been-different questions about the target
phenomenon by manipulating the model. Manipulating a model means ‘playing
around’ with the model, i.e. varying the model parameters, the parameterisa-
tions, the discretisation-based numerical schemes, or the initial conditions, and
then running computer simulations in order to explore the resulting changes
in the simulated phenomenon and to get a sense of the qualitative behaviour
of the model. Then, a model is more or less intelligible and can thus provide
more or less understanding (along this criterion) depending on the number of
what-if-things-would-have-been-different questions it can enable the agent to
answer.
That said, as Kuorikoski and Ylikoski (2015) make it clear, “it is not enough
to be able to make just any inferences one wishes; one must get those inferences
right” (3819). Therefore, evaluative criteria, used to assess to which extent the
model is an accurate representation of the target phenomenon, are also required.
In what follows, our aim is to articulate additional evaluative criteria of under-
standing that assess the connection of the model with the target phenomenon.
2.2 Representational accuracy
Models can provide scientists with understanding if they are adequate represen-
tations for providing explanations. In this regard, representational accuracy is a
second important criterion for understanding with a model. It is evaluated with
regard to how well a model captures the relevant physical processes at work in
the target system under investigation.
Physics-based equations aim at explicitly describing the physical processes
of interest in mathematical terms, and are supposed to contribute to a better
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representational accuracy in virtue of their high degree of confirmation. In con-
trast, statistical techniques deliver model outputs based on functional relations
between model inputs and outputs that rely on statistical rather than physical
considerations.
Representational accuracy depends on the way a model captures the physi-
cal processes, but also the extent to which the system’s aspects being omitted
are relevant for the purpose under consideration, and the degree of idealisation.
Thus, a physics-based equation can be more accurate than another one if, for
instance, it describes additional variables of interest in a comprehensive man-
ner, or if it corrects for previous misrepresentations such as parameterisations
or model biases. Representational accuracy can be constrained by the available
computational means: stronger computational power allows higher resolution,
which, in turn, is supposed to generate smaller discretisation errors, thus in-
creasing overall representational accuracy.
Representational accuracy is one evaluative criterion of understanding with
a model. But understanding clearly involves further criteria. For instance,
a physics-based equation may be better than a mere statistical correlation at
describing some of the physical processes at stake in the target system, but can
still fail to account for observational data in a satisfactory way (e.g. because
of various biases). More criteria are therefore needed to explicate how we can
legitimately gain understanding from models: they include empirical accuracy,
physical consistency and delimiting the domain of validity.
2.3 Empirical accuracy
Empirical accuracy is evaluated with regard to how well the model outputs
match the available observations. This third criterion is evaluated on the basis
of the model outputs (while representational accuracy can be assessed on the
basis of the model, before even running the computer programme).
However, it is recognized that meeting empirical accuracy is not sufficient
to provide understanding. Indeed, a model matching the available data may
remain unable to yield explanations of phenomena that occur beyond the domain
covered by the available data. Thus, for the model to be adequate beyond this
domain (e.g. in view of making future climate projections), one should appeal
to additional criteria, in particular coherence with background knowledge, as
recently emphasised by Baumberger et al. (2017).
2.4 Physical consistency
Physical consistency of the model outputs constitutes an additional criterion for
understanding with a model. In particular, when data is missing, it is worth
questioning whether the model outputs are physically plausible, i.e. coherent
with background knowledge. This latter typically includes fundamental physi-
cal laws like conservation laws, available empirical relationships, and observed
behaviour of relevant physical processes.
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From our perspective, physical consistency partly contributes to building
confidence in climate projections (as rightly defended by Baumberger et al.
2017), in virtue of providing (some degree of) understanding of the relevant
phenomena with the considered model. It should be noted that if physical con-
sistency is closely related to (and clearly not independent from) representational
accuracy, the two should be clearly distinguished and considered separately (as
we will also see in the case studies below in sections 3 and 4)—in particu-
lar, representational accuracy involves certain more pragmatic aspects, such as
idealisation, that are absent from (and possibly in tension with) the physical
consistency criterion.4 Now, we believe that an additional important criterion,
which has not yet been much discussed in relation to understanding, is especially
relevant in the climate context.
2.5 Delimiting the domain of validity
Delimiting the domain of validity, we believe, is a genuine token of understand-
ing. Models are not supposed to be reliable in any circumstances but, since
they are only partial and idealised representations of the target phenomena,
they should be adequate for the specific purpose (or set of purposes) at stake
(Parker 2020). If scientists don’t know the domain of validity of the model they
are using, they encounter the risk of misusing it, e.g., of running the simula-
tion in a physical domain in which the underlying model fails to apply. Insofar
as simulations are ‘doomed to succeed’, they would deliver misleading outputs
when used in domains on which they are not supposed to apply.
In particular, users who did not participate in the model development process
may not be aware of the precise model idealisations being involved, and of the
extent to which they are valid in the target domain. For example, a fluid
dynamics model assuming that a fluid is a macroscopic continuum does not
apply in transitional flow regime or collisionless flow regime (Meiburg 1986).
But there are subtler cases for which the scope of the underlying model can be
difficult to assess, as we will discuss in the next sections.
Importantly, we should specify that a narrow scope of validity is no reason to
believe that the model does not yield understanding; it yields understanding to
some (limited) extent. As soon as one is able to delimit the scope of validity, be
it narrow or large, then one certainly gains some understanding with the model.
This fifth criterion also bears on the agent’s ability and skill of grasping the
extent to which the model correctly applies, which may involve the first crite-
rion of understanding we have discussed above, namely intelligibility—here, the
ability to manipulate the model and identify qualitatively the model’s possible
problematic behaviour, in view of evaluating its domain of validity.
4In Knüsel and Baumberger (2020), empirical accuracy and representational accuracy are
also closely related notions: they see the first as an evaluative criterion for the second. What
we mean with representational accuracy here also partly includes what they call—but leave
on the side—representational depth. Note that we do not make the distinction between
dimensions of understanding and evaluative criteria for understanding, since we reckon that
the former, as we define them here, are also directly evaluative.
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As we see, the five criteria of understanding we have articulated—
intelligibility, representational accuracy, empirical accuracy, physical consis-
tency, delimiting the domain of validity—are not independent of each other;
for example, delimiting the domain of validity also relies on the assessment of
representational accuracy and empirical accuracy.
However, it could still be thought that intelligibility in particular is inde-
pendent from the other criteria of adequacy; indeed, some philosophers, e.g.
Sullivan (2019), even claim that, in the case of machine learning models, un-
derstanding with a model can be achieved without understanding these models
better than we currently do. However, we think that this claim is inaccurate.
For example, increasing our understanding through manipulability could lead
to an understanding of how robust a model behaves under small changes in the
input; this, in turn, is relevant for empirical adequacy, say, if the model is not
robust and this is an artifact of the model itself, not a feature of the target
system.
We will now apply these five evaluative criteria to two important case studies
in the climate modelling context, involving statistical downscaling and machine
learning methods. We will argue on this basis that understanding (according to
the criteria defined here) actually comes in degrees and that, therefore, machine
learning methods do not necessarily constitute a radical departure from standard
statistical tools, as far as understanding is concerned.
3 Understanding with statistical downscaling
In the face of the climate challenge, information about climate change at the
regional scale is crucially needed, in particular in view of adaptation (but also, to
some extent, for mitigation). Indeed, adaptation measures naturally take place
at the regional scale: for instance, it is the change in precipitation patterns at
the local rather than global scale that is relevant in order to devise appropriate
measures (e.g. against possible future flooding). In this context, downscaling
constitutes a family of methods that aim to provide regional climate change
information in view of impact assessments; in this sense, downscaling techniques
can furnish decision makers with relevant tools to address (the adaptation side
of) the climate challenge.
This section investigates to what extent regional climate modelling—and
more specifically: downscaling techniques—can provide some understanding of
the target regional climate system, where understanding is articulated using
the five criteria we have introduced in section 2. In particular, regional climate
modelling and downscaling allow us to focus on the impact of standard sta-
tistical techniques on understanding in the climate context. After introducing
the idea of downscaling in the main lines—taking the recent climate scenarios
for Switzerland CH2018 as an illustration—we discuss to what extent our five
criteria for understanding are affected by downscaling techniques.
8
3.1 Dynamical and statistical downscaling
In the context of producing climate change information, downscaling aims to
bridge the modelling gap between, on the one hand, the large scales where
global circulation models (GCM) operate and, on the other hand, the regional
and local scales relevant for impact assessments. There are two main fami-
lies of downscaling techniques, namely dynamical downscaling and statistical
downscaling. In very schematic terms, dynamical downscaling involves high-
resolution regional climate models (RCMs) whose boundary conditions are pre-
scribed (‘driven’) by GCMs (the RCM is said to be ‘nested’ into the GCM);
in contrast, statistical downscaling aims at identifying empirical-statistical re-
lationships between relevant climate variables at the large and local scales, in
view of applying these relationships to future climate projections. Dynami-
cal and statistical downscaling are not exclusive; the two can be combined in
a two-step process (dynamical downscaling first, then statistical downscaling,
as in the example discussed below). Indeed, from a post-processing perspec-
tive, statistical downscaling naturally includes the correction or adjustment of
regional climate model output biases with the help of an empirical-statistical
link with observations (bias correction, also sometimes denoted ‘model output
statistics’).5 Within the framework of climate change projections, it is crucial
to emphasise that such bias correction makes sense only under the assumption
that the empirical-statistical link that is used remains stationary.
3.2 Example: CH2018
These are very general considerations and it can be helpful to briefly discuss a
concrete example. We consider the recent climate scenarios CH2018 for Switzer-
land. These scenarios constitute an example of state-of-the-art regional climate
change information in view of climate change impact assessment and decision-
making. Moreover, the geographical location, small size and complex Alpine
topography make regional climate modelling for Switzerland particularly inter-
esting and relevant. Among other outputs, CH2018 provides localised projec-
tions at meteorological stations and on a high-resolution (2 km) grid for various
climate variables, for three future 30-year periods, 2020-2049, 2045-2074 and
2070-2099 (1981-2010 being the reference period), and for three standard “Rep-
resentative Concentration Pathways” (RCPs), which encode the anthropogenic
forcing corresponding to different emission scenarios up to 2100, from 2°C com-
pliant mitigation to unabated emissions (RCP2.6, RCP4.5 and RCP8.5, see
5Biases in model outputs can have different origins, one of the most obvious being the finite
resolution of climate models, leading to various types of model errors at the global, regional
and local scales. It is important to emphasise that bias correction “cannot overcome errors
from a substantial misrepresentation of relevant processes” (Maraun and Widman 2018, 117),
in particular such as global scale circulation biases or missing (or misrepresented) local scale
processes (e.g. linked to complex orography, as in the example discussed below); to evaluate
precisely when relevant processes are being substantially misrepresented can of course be a
tricky issue (especially in the climate change context) and actually lies at the heart of the
discussion below.
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IPCC 2013, ch. 12.3).6 These localised projections are based on regional climate
models (RCMs) from the standardised ensemble EURO-CORDEX, with bound-
ary conditions prescribed by GCMs from the CMIP5 ensemble.7 In the post-
processing phase, RCM outputs are bias-corrected, in particular using quantile
mapping techniques, and further statistically downscaled (to the stations or the
high-resolution grid).
The central elements of quantile mapping are (quantile-based) transfer or
correction functions matching the model simulation (quantiles) with the refer-
ence observations (quantiles) in the historical calibration period; climate change
projections can then be bias-corrected using these transfer functions, crucially
assuming their time-invariance. In the context of CH2018, quantile mapping
also includes a downscaling step for localised projections: it relates the model
outputs at a certain scale (e.g. on a certain grid) to observations at a smaller
scale, e.g. on a higher-resolution grid or directly to individual meteorological
stations. For instance, in the latter case, the quantile mapping reference for
daily mean temperature consists of observations of this variable in the period
1981-2010 from 85 weather stations distributed across Switzerland; these ref-
erence observations allow for the calibration of the bias correction, which can
then be applied to ‘raw’ regional climate model (simulation) outputs in order
to provide bias corrected (and downscaled) regional climate change signals for
the considered variable (e.g. mean temperature) at individual meteorological
stations (see CH2018, ch. 5).
3.3 Understanding with statistical downscaling
How does downscaling impact our understanding of the regional climate system
under consideration and of the related regional climate change signal? We can
evaluate this impact using the five criteria for understanding we have defined in
section 2. This topic can be seen as part of the discussion on the added value
of regional climate modelling and downscaling (e.g. see recently Rummukainen
2016 and Maraun and Widman 2018, in particular ch. 15 & 17), with a focus
on the explanatory and understanding-related dimensions. It should also be
mentioned that there is actually a plethora of methods that are referred to as
downscaling in the climate science literature, and we do not aim to discuss
them all in detail (see Table 1 in Hewitson et al. 2014, 546-547 for a good
overview). We rather discuss generic features of downscaling—and of statistical
downscaling in particular8—related to the issue of understanding (partly relying
6We closely follow CH2018 here, to which we refer for more details.
7CMIP5 is the fifth phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project, which provides a
standardised framework for comparing GCM simulations; EURO-CORDEX is the European
branch of the Coordinate Regional Climate Downscaling Experiment, which is the regional
counterpart of CMIP5 for RCM simulations.
8From the point of view of understanding, regional climate modelling involving ‘only’
dynamical downscaling raises similar issues as global climate modelling (e.g. about model
complexity, parameterisation and opacity); in contrast, and to a certain extent, statistical
downscaling involves some different—typically statistical—issues for understanding, akin to
those encountered in machine learning approaches (see section 4).
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on CH2018 as a concrete example).
• Intelligibility. Several features of both dynamical and statistical down-
scaling may hinder the ability to get a sense of the qualitative behaviour
of the model through manipulability in counterfactual situations. For
instance, regional climate models may inherit biases from their driving
GCMs through the boundary conditions and thus have their qualitative
behaviour affected—as already mentioned in footnote 8, dynamical down-
scaling raises similar issues for intelligibility (and understanding in gen-
eral) as global climate modelling. Statistical downscaling further limits the
manipulability of the downscaled model in view of meaningfully addressing
what-if-things-would-have-been-different questions, and hence limits the
intelligibility of the model: in generic terms, the main worry is that an-
swers to what-if-things-would-have-been-different questions can turn out
to be mere statistical artifacts (especially if the stationarity assumption
of the empirical-statistical link or bias correction is violated, such as pos-
sibly in a climate change context). An example of a statistical artifact,
mentioned in CH2018, is that quantile mapping “tends to amplify temper-
ature changes at high elevations along the Alpine ridge and to dampen
change signals in valleys”, while noting that these “modifications cannot
be explained by physical reasoning in a straightforward sense” (85)—this
issue is also clearly related to representational accuracy, to which we turn
next. However, more generally, this does not mean that statistical down-
scaling prevents any intelligibility of the downscaled models, but the issue
requires a very careful and case-by-case evaluation.9
• Representational accuracy. Within the dynamical downscaling compo-
nent, increasing resolution and complexity can involve an increase in repre-
sentational accuracy to some extent, depending on the context (variables,
regions, etc.), for instance through the better resolution of the topography
of the region under consideration. The important point is that dynamical
downscaling can unveil physical mechanisms that are left unseen by lower
resolution models; as a consequence, the climate change signal from RCMs
and GCMs can be relevantly different (see e.g. the examples discussed in
Rummukainen 2016, 151-153). This is in stark contrast with the statisti-
cal downscaling component of regional climate modelling, which is mainly
statistical and data-driven. In this sense, statistically downscaled models
can perform poorly in terms of representational accuracy—and, in general,
statistical downscaling does not improve representational accuracy—since
the sub-grid physical processes (beyond the scale resolved by the under-
lying regional climate models) that can be at the origin of the biases to
be corrected are simply not considered. As already mentioned above, sta-
tistical downscaling can actually introduce certain statistical artifacts and
9Various limitations to statistical downscaling (and to the intelligibility of statistically
downscaled models) arise in particular in “topographically structured terrain” such as the
Alpine region of Switzerland.
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additional biases; for example, quantile mapping in CH2018 can “misrepre-
sent spatial climate variability on short timescales” (99). Indeed, it seems
that adequate application of statistical downscaling and bias correction
requires some prior knowledge of the representational accuracy of the rel-
evant underlying processes as well as of the biases themselves (Maraun et
al. 2017).
• Empirical accuracy. Generally speaking, the discussion about empirical
accuracy is similar in many ways in the case of regional climate modelling
as in the case of global climate modelling.10 An important aspect of the
discussion concerns future climate projections, for which there is obviously
no direct way to evaluate their empirical accuracy; moreover, empirical
accuracy with past and current observations is clearly not a sufficient con-
dition for warranting confidence in future climate (change) projections, see
the discussion in e.g. Baumberger et al. (2017).11 There is also a straight-
forward sense in which, in principle, statistical downscaling involving bias
correction (e.g. such as quantile mapping in the case of CH2018), can di-
rectly improve empirical accuracy, since, very schematically, models out-
puts are corrected toward observations; however, the evaluation of bias
correction techniques can be difficult—e.g. cross-validation may not be
relevant, because “model and observations are not in synchrony” (Maraun
et al. 2017, 765)—especially under climate change conditions (see Maraun
and Widman 2018, ch. 15 & 16).
• Physical consistency. To the extent that “statistical downscaling meth-
ods [. . . ] do not represent the fundamental laws of thermodynamics and
fluid dynamics” (Maraun and Widman 2018, 273), physical consistency is
not guaranteed a priori in this context, and so needs careful evaluation.
Specific aspects of this issue include inter-variable consistency and inher-
itance of large-scale circulations biases (affecting the driving GCMs) or
consistency with the large-scale flow (as described by the driving GCMs)
(for instance, see the discussion in CH2018, §5.7 in the case of the climate
scenarios for Switzerland; see also Maraun et al. 2017).
• Domain of validity. Within the statistical downscaling framework, one of
the crucial assumptions in this respect is the stationarity of the climate
model biases and hence of the correction function. From a climate change
perspective, this assumption is meaningful only up to some point—in very
10For instance, empirical accuracy is not the same for all variables; e.g., it is in general better
for temperature than for precipitation. It should be noted that, overall, empirical accuracy is
better at the global scale than at the regional and local scales.
11One reason has to do with the role of calibration of parameter values in achieving empirical
accuracy with past and current observations. Another important reason relates to the criteria
concerning representational accuracy and the domain of validity (see below): in the context
of radically different boundary conditions, such as high forcing scenarios, certain empirical
parameterisation procedures may not be valid anymore and important feedbacks may be
missing.
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rough and intuitive terms: when training or historical data are not rep-
resentative anymore. But it is extremely difficult to pin down precisely
this point in a given concrete situation; consequently, it is extremely diffi-
cult to define precisely the domain of validity of (statistical) downscaling
techniques for future climate projections.
Evaluating these criteria for understanding suggests that understanding with
climate models comes in degrees—and, as we have seen in this section, this
is very much so when statistical techniques like statistical downscaling are in-
volved. We will see in the next section that the situation is—perhaps surprisingly—
similar when machine learning methods are involved, despite their aura of nov-
elty and opacity.
4 Understanding with machine learning
In this section, we examine how the use of machine learning (ML) in climate
models affects our ability to understand with climate models. We will do this
with the help of a case study. First, we will briefly review relevant aspects of
ML.
4.1 Machine learning: basic ideas and challenges
ML is a technique to automatically extract rules for classification and predic-
tion from data.12 Here we will only be concerned with supervised learning for
prediction. The goal is to automatically find a rule fˆ that takes a variable x
as an input, and outputs a variable yˆ = fˆ(x), such that the distance between
fˆ(x) = yˆ and the actual value y is small. In the case we will consider here
(Gentine et al. 2018), x is a vector of physical quantities like temperature and
humidity at a given time, while the output yˆ is a vector of physical quantities
like temperature and humidity tendencies.
Gentine et al. (2018) use deep neural networks (DNNs), a kind of ML model
(LeCun et al. 2015; Goodfellow et al. 2016). In DNNs, the input is processed
through many connected layers of a network. Each layer consists of many nodes.
In a simple, fully connected DNN, the value of each node is computed as follows:
First, a weighted sum (plus bias) of the values of the previous layer is computed;
the resulting value is then further processed through a non-linear activation
function. The parameters of a DNN are the weights and biases. The basic idea
of supervised learning is to train the DNN on a data set X = {(xi, yi)}i∈I ,
where xi is an input instance, and yi is the correct output for that instance.
The DNN is fed with a subset of X, a so-called batch, and computes the output
yˆi for the inputs xi of this batch. Then the distance between the output yˆi and
the correct answer yi is calculated using a loss function; this provides us with a
12Note that this section provides a standard overview of some basic, well-known facts about
machine learning; similar, more detailed accounts can be found in any good introduction to
machine learning or deep learning (Hastie et al. 2009; Goodfellow et al. 2016).
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measure of the error made by the DNN. In the next, learning step, the weights
and biases of the network are adapted to make the error a little smaller. The
error correction is propagated backwards through the network. This procedure
is repeated until the set X is exhausted. Trained DNNs are evaluated using a
test set X ′, which is drawn from the same distribution as X, but disjoint from
it. This procedure is the foundation of the recent surge of applications of deep
learning.
Despite their success, many questions with respect to ML models and their
use in science remain open. Leading figures in ML research have called DNNs
black boxes (Alain and Bengio 2016). One of the main issues is that while
DNNs have been applied successfully, a theoretical understanding of this suc-
cess and many of their properties is still missing (Goodfellow et al. 2016; Vidal
et al. 2017). There are also challenges that arise from the use of ML mod-
els in the context of climate modelling in particular (Reichstein et al. 2019).
These challenges include guaranteeing physical consistency, the heterogeneity
and high-dimensional nature of climate data, and obtaining labeled training
data for the application of supervised learning techniques.
4.2 Case study: machine learning approach to convective
parameterisation
To better understand the advantages and challenges of understanding with ML
in climate science, we now turn to a case where DNNs are used in climate
modelling (Gentine et al. 2018). In this case, an existing, physics-based climate
model is taken as a starting point. Physical sub-models of this climate model
are then replaced by DNNs in order to make parameterisation computationally
tractable. We first give a short account of this case; then we turn to the question
how the use of DNNs affects our ability to understand climate phenomena.13
Current climate models with parameterised convection cannot capture some
aspects of convection that are relevant to climate predictions. For example,
so-called mesoscale convective systems (MCS), systems of thunderstorms of the
order of 100 km in diameter, are not accurately represented. Problems with
parameterised convection could in principle be overcome by using climate models
with higher resolution, specifically, horizontal grids of 2 km or less. Cloud
resolving models (CRMs) are able to accurately represent relevant aspects of
MCSs. The use of global CRMs would therefore be highly desirable. However,
such models are computationally intractable for timescales relevant to climate
modelling (several decades and more).
One approach to overcome this problem is superparameterisation (SP). The
idea behind SP is to add a layer of fine-grained CRMs to a large-scale global
13It could be asked whether this case is representative of the use of machine learning in
climate science. It is difficult to answer this question, because the use of DNNs in climate
science is still relatively novel, see Reichstein et al. (2019). The results by Gentine et al. (2018)
can be interpreted as proof of concept: they show that DNNs have the potential to address
some computational problems. Consequently, climate projections under different forcings are
not considered.
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circulation model (GCM); see Khairoutdinov et al. (2005) for details. The GCM
is spatially coarse-grained with horizontal grids of the order of 100 km; the
CRMs are more fine-grained, physics-based models, which are embedded into
each grid cell. The CRMs run independent of each other, with time-steps of
about 20s; the GCM runs on time-steps of about 1h. The two layers are coupled:
At each time step of the GCM, the CRMs are forced by the large-scale tendencies
of the GCM. The CRMs, in turn, return an average of the locally calculated
physical variables to the GCM. In this way, the evolution of the entire model is
a mixture of local and global tendencies.
Of course, SP comes with its own problems. SP is computationally expen-
sive, such that several idealisations have to be introduced. For one, there is no
direct interaction between the CRMs except via the global level. Some versions
of SP are 2D, which means that the physical evolution is only calculated for
one horizontal direction, e.g., east-west; in calculating the spatial average, the
CRMs output is a statistical sample. Finally, aspects of convection are still not
accurately represented by GCMs augmented by SP due to physical idealisations.
This is where machine learning comes in. Gentine et al. (2018) replaced the
8129 CRM modules of an SP model with DNNs in order to obtain a better
convection parameterisation. Specifically, they used the so-called SuperParam-
eterised Community Atmosphere Model (SPCAM-3), a well-known GCM, to
obtain training and test data for the DNNs. The SPCAM was set up in a
configuration which simulates an aqua planet with a resolution of the order of
100 km. 8129 CRMs are embedded in this version of SPCAM; they interact
as described above. Gentine et al. (2018) ran this model for a period of two
years and made a record of the CRM’s input and output. Half of these data,
the first year, was set aside for training the DNNs, and the other half as test
data (validation). They then prepared 8129 copies of DNNs, and trained them
on the training set obtained from the original SPCAM. Finally, they added the
trained DNNs to a global model, which they called CBRAIN. This model was
validated by comparing the output of CBRAIN with the output of SPCAM-3
of the second year.
The general conclusion drawn by Gentine et al. (2018) is positive. They
found that SPCAM-3 and CBRAIN agree surprisingly well. They claim to have
demonstrated that DNNs can “skillfully represent many of the effects of unre-
solved clouds and convection” (Gentine et al. 2018, 5748). In their discussion,
Gentine et al. (2018) highlight the computational efficiency of CBRAIN in com-
parison to SPCAM as the main benefit; tests show that CBRAIN is ten times
faster than SPCAM. They identify two main challenges: First, DNNs do not
accurately represent some physical properties; in particular, they do not capture
energy and moisture conservation, which is required for climate prediction. Sec-
ond, it is not clear whether CBRAIN will generalise well in situations not repre-
sented in the training data; for example, it is not clear whether CBRAIN would
accurately represent convection over continents, because it has been trained on
data from an aqua planet.
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4.3 Understanding with machine learning
What does this case tell us about the prospect of gaining understanding from
climate models that use DNNs? We will now evaluate the proposal by Gentine
et al. using the five criteria we have outlined in section 2.
• Intelligibility. First, it is a general, well-known fact that DNNs are not
robust with respect to manipulations of the input. A prominent example
for this deficiency is the existence of adversarial examples (Szegedy et al.
2014). These are inputs designed to fool the models into making classifica-
tion errors; usually, the manipulations are such that, in the case of input
images, the perturbed inputs cannot be distinguished from the original by
humans. Importantly, while computer scientists know how to construct
adversarial examples, they do not yet fully understand why they occur
and how models can be made robust against them. Thus, arguably, intel-
ligibility with respect to manipulability in DNNs is low in general. Then,
the CBRAIN modellers did not try to improve their understanding of the
ML components of the model through manipulating either inputs or pa-
rameters. Presumably, one reason for this is that the input and parameter
space are just too big to be investigated systematically, and it is not clear
what would be achieved by carrying out just a few manipulations. Finally,
what researchers working with DNNs do routinely is tweak these models
to improve performance, by adapting optimisation procedures and other
features of the learning algorithm. However, this does not improve intelli-
gibility per se, because it is mostly geared towards a better performance,
not towards understanding how the model behaves in different kinds of
circumstances. All these points suggest that intelligibility decreases, or at
least does not increase, by using DNNs in CBRAIN.
• Representational accuracy. In the case we just considered, representational
accuracy is the degree to which the SPCAM, and CBRAIN, respectively,
faithfully represent the physical processes producing the output variables,
convective heating and moistening, and longwave and shortwave heating
rates. The representational accuracy of CBRAIN is lower in comparison
to SPCAM. The latter in itself is already highly idealised in several re-
spects; and the GCM part is the same in both models. However, the CRM
submodels of SPCAM are based on physical equations. This is not the
case for the DNNs that replace the CRMs in CBRAIN. The only objective
of the DNNs is to minimise the empirical error with respect to the output
variables. There is no requirement for representational accuracy.
• Empirical accuracy. By decreasing computational costs, CBRAIN makes
it possible to obtain predictions for longer time periods, while the empir-
ical accuracy is comparable to the physical simulation by SPCAM in the
periods for which we have empirical data. Thus, for this criterion, there
is an increase of understanding because CBRAIN provides comparable
empirical accuracy, but, potentially, for a longer period of time, due to
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computational gains. However, the increase in understanding has to be
qualified, as Gentine et al. (2018) acknowledge: there is no guarantee that
CBRAIN is empirically adequate if boundary conditions change, e.g., if
the planet had land masses. Thus, there is uncertainty with respect to
this criterion. We will return to this point below.14
• Physical consistency. Gentine et al. (2018) point out that that the DNNs
do not intrinsically satisfy energy and moisture conservation, which is
a relevant kind of physical consistency. They write: “This can be fine
for implementation in a weather forecast model but energy and moisture
conservation are required for climate prediction” (Ibid, 5748). Thus, we
have a loss of understanding in CBRAIN in comparison to SPCAM, where
conservation laws are easier to check. Also, physical consistency becomes
more relevant at the timescales of climate predictions.
• Domain of validity. Along this criterion, CBRAIN will presumably per-
form worse than SPCAM. The reason for this is that the DNNs have only
been trained on a dataset that represents a very specific type of scenario,
viz., an aqua planet with a very specific range of physical variables. As
soon as boundary conditions change, or if global temperatures change,
there is no guarantee that CBRAIN will still agree with SPCAM. In fact,
it is well known that DNNs are very unreliable when applied to out-of-
distribution data (see also Kawamleh (2021) on this very limit of DNNs).
Thus, the use of DNNs may be particularly problematic in the case of
climate change.
At this point, an important feature of this case should be stressed. Gentine
et al. (2018) replace physics-based CRMs with DNNs. In order to do this, they
first generate training and test data using SPCAM. Thus, this case highlights
advantages and drawbacks of understanding with DNNs if we have access to
clean, synthetically generated data. However, this is not always the case, as
highlighted in Reichstein et al. (2019). If we were to use real data, there are
additional problems with obtaining labeled training data, and also with messy,
high-dimensional data. Thus, the present case only provides a partial picture
of the challenges of understanding with DNNs in the climate context.
5 Understanding in degrees
In this section, we systematically compare how the respective (statistical) meth-
ods used in the two case studies affect our ability to understand climate phe-
nomena.
14Gentine et al. (2018) do not examine or discuss how CBRAIN would perform with respect
to different forcings, or how well it is suited to address the issue of climate change in general.
In principle, it is possible to evaluate how well CBRAIN performs in comparison to SPCAM
for different boundary conditions, because SPCAM can generate test data for a variety of
boundary conditions, and one could evaluate CBRAIN on these test sets.
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Before we begin with the comparison, we should clarify what exactly it
is that we are comparing. Our question is how the use of the two (sets of)
methods—statistical downscaling in RCMs and the use of DNNs as an alter-
native to superparameterisation—affects our ability to understand with the re-
spective climate models. We should note a dissimilarity between the two case
studies: in the machine learning example, we examined the difference between
a ‘base case’, which does not use DNNs (that is, SPCAM) and the case in
which DNNs are used (that is, CBRAIN). In contrast, downscaling techniques
provide regional climate (change) information at resolutions that are in gen-
eral not available without them (e.g. by GCMs); in this latter case, we can
however investigate to what extent downscaling techniques provide additional
understanding compared to GCMs.
How do the two methods affect understanding? Beginning with the criterion
of intelligibility, both statistical downscaling and DNNs in GCMs do not fare
well with respect to manipulability and anticipating the qualitative behavior
of the model; the use of both methods arguably makes things worse. The
specific reasons—biases in the case of statistical downscaling, errors for small
perturbations in the case of DNNs—are different for the two methods, but the
common root of the problem is that both run the danger of exhibiting statistical
artifacts. Intelligibility may decrease more in the case of DNNs in comparison
to statistical downscaling,15 particularly due to robustness (see section 4).
Along the criterion of representational accuracy, we can observe that both
statistical downscaling and DNNs in GCMs create challenges because they are
not designed to capture the processes producing the output variables. In a nut-
shell, both are statistical techniques that try to reproduce input-output patterns.
However, in both cases, there is not a total loss of representational accuracy. In
the case of statistical downscaling, the GCM, as well as the dynamical downscal-
ing step, are based on physical equations and thus representationally accurate
to a certain extent. The same is true for the GCM in the second case, which is
combined with DNNs.
Turning to empirical accuracy, we see that there is a (qualified) increase in
both cases. In the case of statistical downscaling, variables are bias-corrected
to match observations, which increases empirical accuracy. The use of DNNs
makes it possible to obtain predictions that are comparable to predictions with-
out DNNs, but for longer periods (thanks to their smaller computational costs
compared to superparameterisation). Thus, arguably, empirical accuracy is in-
creased. In both cases, a qualification related to the domain of validity has to
be added: it is difficult to gauge the empirical accuracy of both methods for
climate (change) projections.
At this point, it should be stressed that the purpose of using the methods
15The precise extent to which statistical downscaling methods allow for some manipulability
(and hence for some intelligibility) is an open (and a case-by-case) issue; there is actually a
call in the climate modelling community for designing “ensembles of statistical downscaling
methods or even ensembles combining GCMs, RCMs and a range of statistical methods”
(Maraun and Widman 2018, 284)—such ensembles would help to get a clearer picture on the
manipulability issue.
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in the two cases is different. In the case of statistical downscaling in RCMs,
the goal is to adapt a GCM to a regional context such that climate projections
can be obtained at a higher spatial resolution. Accordingly, empirical accuracy
increases because model output is changed to match observations. In the case
of DNNs, model output is not corrected. Rather, the goal is to overcome a com-
putational deadlock, and DNNs make it possible to obtain predictions which
would not be available otherwise. Still, both methods are geared towards im-
proving predictive capabilities—higher precision in one case, more predictions
in the other.
Physical consistency is not guaranteed in both cases. This is certainly a
drawback in comparison to physics-based modelling. Lack of physical consis-
tency can lead to problems in the context of climate predictions specifically.
However, it should be noted that while physical consistency is not guaranteed
due to the statistical nature of the methods—this is related to the lack of rep-
resentational accuracy—we can expect that physical consistency is satisfied to
a certain degree, because we have a certain degree of empirical accuracy.
Finally, the domain of validity criterion is a reason for concern in both cases.
For both statistical downscaling and DNNs in GCMs, it is necessary to make
stationarity assumptions, viz., that training or observational data are valid for
future scenarios (this is critical in the context of climate change projections).
In both cases, it is extremely hard to pin down when we should expect this
assumption to be violated. One difference between the two methods is that
DNNs are known to be very sensitive to changes in the underlying distribution,
i.e., to non-stationarity. We should expect that applying DNNs outside a known
domain will lead to inaccurate predictions along all criteria discussed above.
Taking stock, we can see that both statistical downscaling and the use of
DNNs affect the five criteria of understanding in a qualitatively similar manner.
Both are statistical methods that are not based on physical principles, and thus
may involve a decrease of understanding along the criteria of intelligibility, rep-
resentational accuracy and physical consistency. The strength of both methods
is to increase empirical accuracy. This supports the thesis that there is not
a categorial difference between machine learning methods and more traditional
statistical techniques, as far as understanding is concerned. This does not mean,
however, that the two methods are on a par.
The two cases also support the thesis that understanding as a whole comes
in degrees. All five criteria we considered should not be interpreted as yielding
categorial results, but relative increases or decreases. In both cases, the methods
are applied in the context of complex models, and in combination with physics-
based components, idealisations, further statistical techniques, and thus do not
affect our ability to understand with these models in a categorical manner, but
gradually. In particular, it is wrong to say that the use of statistical downscaling,
or of machine learning, leads to an overall loss of understanding.
We can also observe that in both cases, there are similar tradeoffs between
the five criteria of understanding. In a nutshell, the tradeoff is between an
increase of empirical accuracy and a decrease along the other four criteria. This
also implies that we cannot interpret the use of any one of these methods as
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yielding a loss or a gain in understanding tout court. The five criteria we have
proposed in this article precisely aim to articulate and shed some light on these
tradeoffs as well as the various aspects of understanding. And the latter, in turn,
show that, with respect to understanding, regional climate models obtained from
‘common’ statistical downscaling16 and climate models using ‘fancy’ machine
learning methods such as deep neural networks are actually part of the same
continuum, where the various criteria of understanding come in degrees.
Finally, a word of caution is in order. We have not argued that the use of
statistical techniques or of machine learning in the context of climate models is
unproblematic because these methods do not necessarily lead to a loss of under-
standing. Rather, we have argued that these methods do affect certain criteria
of understanding, and in particular what could be called the physical (and ex-
planatory) criteria of understanding. This, of course, may well be problematic,
because, for instance, a loss of process understanding affects our confidence in
climate predictions (see Baumberger et al. 2017).
6 Conclusion
A central goal of climate modelling is to provide projections in view of decision-
making with respect to climate change. But understanding is not secondary.
Understanding is indispensable to appropriately evaluate climate models and to
build confidence in climate projections.
Contemporary techniques in climate modelling, including statistical methods
and machine learning techniques, are, to some extent, like black boxes and,
despite the fact that they can considerably enhance our predictive abilities,
they affect our ability to understand with climate models.
In order to assess the impact of statistical methods and machine learning
techniques on understanding with climate models, we have articulated five cri-
teria for understanding: intelligibility, representational accuracy, empirical ac-
curacy, physical consistency and delimiting the domain of validity.
We have argued that these criteria are not categorical, but come in degrees.
We have put these five criteria to work in two important case studies in the
climate context. In the first case, we have investigated (statistical) downscaling
techniques, which play a crucial role in the elaboration of regional climate change
information and impact assessments. In the second case, we have contrasted
these standard statistical techniques with the machine learning approach in
climate modelling, focusing specifically on the use of deep neural networks as
an alternative to superparameterisation in a global circulation model.
The main upshot of the paper is a twofold continuity of the multidimensional
and graded notion of understanding in the climate modelling context. First, the
use of machine learning decreases understanding along some criteria; however,
the same tendencies can also be observed for more standard statistical meth-
ods such as those involved in downscaling, showing that there is no categorical
16Downscaling techniques are applied in weather forecasting since the late 1950s (see Maraun
and Widman 2018, ch. 3).
20
difference between the two cases, as far as understanding is concerned. Sec-
ond, we have highlighted the tradeoff between an increase in empirical accuracy
(the main focus of both the statistical and machine learning methods in the cli-
mate context) and a decrease along the criteria of intelligibility, representational
accuracy, physical consistency and delimiting the domain of validity.
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